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Abstract 
It is over fifty years since most countries in Africa became independent but the debate about the role of 
nationalists in the quest for African independence remains controversial. While some opinions hold that 
independence in Africa was granted (given) to the Africans, others hold the premise that it was fought for by the 
Africans to the point of achievement. As Cameroon celebrated its 50th anniversary of independence and 
reunification in 2014 (4 years behind schedule) we thought that as teachers of African history, our contribution 
to the celebrations was to give a fresh account of the road to independence in French Cameroon with the hope of 
throwing light to the ‘granting-achieving’ positions. Our account is mainly established from primary sources 
(especially newspapers) from the National archives Yaoundé. 
 
1. Introduction 
These are a series of important events that touch on the political life of our country. 
They are historic events and their dates will remain, I think, marked in the history of 
Cameroon, its evolution and political maturity… they are historic  because they mark 
stages and actions of important consideration of very high repute for our country. 
These events, I must say, will be the preoccupation of historians, political critiques 
and jurists… Today, a new event is going to be added in the annals of Cameroon 
history. 
Andre Marie Mbida to ALCAM; Yaoundé May 15 1957 
When Andre-Marie Mbida made this speech in 1957, he fully understood that the actions of political 
leaders would forever remain the subject of scholarly scrutiny and the preoccupation of historians. He was 
certain (on the day he made this speech) that a new event would inspire a study of the period of history in which 
he played a great role as is being done, today fifty-three years later. This chapter discusses the political activities 
that occurred between 1957 and 1960 and led to the achievement of independence and the creation of the 
Republic of Cameroon. It is a historical narrative of the initiatives of both Cameroonian and non-Cameroonian   
actors, including reforms, meetings, legislation and other developments which contributed in one way or another 
to the attainment of political and economic sovereignty by Cameroon. It begins with a background of events that 
took place prior to 1957, to enable the reader understand why the year 1957 is strategic in the history of the 
territory 
 
2. Prelude to 1957 
The years before the outbreak of the Second World War are a good starting point for a proper understanding of 
the roots of Cameroon nationalism. These years witnessed the birth of many political formations and events 
notably; the creation of The Jeunesse Camerounaise Francaise (Juecafra) by Paul Soppo Priso in 1938, (and 
then following) the holding of the Brazzaville conference in 1944, Cameroons participation in the 1946 
Constituent Assemblies in Paris, the signing of the Trusteeship agreement in 1946, the formation of the UPC in 
1948 and the passing of the Outline laws (Loi Cadre) of 1956.   
JEUCAFRA was created at a time when anti-French sentiment in Cameroun was very high. In order to 
restore a good French image, the High Commissioner Richard Brunot, supported Paul Soppo Priso in creating 
the association. Although it started as a forum for expressing the political, social and economic grievances 
against the French colonial administration, the French eventually used it as a political nursery for grooming Pro-
French nationalists in the territory. The founder made it a strenuous commitment to maintain Cameroon as a 
colony of France. This brought disagreements within the association which led to its break up after the war.  
Towards the end of the Second World War the Brazzaville conference was summoned by General 
Charles de Gaulle. It met in the Congo from January 31to February 8, 1944. The conference participants called 
for the elimination of the indiginat, Prestation and Capitation1, the institution of administrative decentralization, 
                                                          
1 W.G. Moseley, Taking Sides: Clashing Views on African Issues,  Dubuque: Mc Graw Hill, 2007. p.59. These were repressive 
laws associated with the French colonial policy of Assimilation. The Indiginat gave French Colonial Administrators the right 
to imprison Cameroonians without having tried them in a law court and without having to justify their action. The Capitation 
was a sort of Head tax which was imposed on all men and women and children above twelve years while Prestation was a 
system of forced labour through which all male French Cameroonians worked compulsorily, without pay, for the government 
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the application of a labour code to cater for the problems of native employees and the right to form trade unions. 
These deliberations led to several reforms in French colonies. By laws of 22 December, 1944 and 20 February 
1945, the Indigenat was abolished. On 11 April 1945, Prestation was formally abolished and in January 1946 the 
status of colony was officially ended as colonies became Territoires d’Outre-Mer (Over-sea territories) with a 
right to have a territorial assembly in which issues concerning the territory could be discussed by natives and 
French settlers. On 7 April 1946, the humiliating status of sujet was abolished and all Africans became citoyens 
although not full fledged French Citizens1.  
Apart from the Brazzaville conference, the creation of the UN and the establishment of the Trusteeship 
Council had very important consequences for the evolution of Cameroun nationalism. It compelled the French to 
promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territory of 
Cameroon. It also required the French to ensure the progressive development of Cameroun towards self-
government or independence in a manner appropriate to the particular circumstances of the territory and its 
people. In view of these dispositions the French government presented to the Trusteeship Committee the 
Trusteeship Agreement for French Cameroon and Togo on November 5 1946. This was accepted by the UN 
General Assembly on December 13.  
Further developments which encouraged political participation in French Cameroon were the 
Constituent Assemblies that were called to draft a new constitution for France between 1944 and 1946. Each 
over-sea territory of West and Equatorial Africa was to be represented in the Constituent Assembly. A decree of 
October 9, 1945 instituted an Assemblee Representative du Cameroun in Yaoundé (ARCAM). This was a 
Representative Assembly whose members would in turn elect representatives to the Paris Assembly. Elections 
into this assembly were on individual basis considering the fact that political parties were not in existent in the 
territory at the time. With these elections, two sheds of opinion were established amongst the political actors of 
French Cameroon. These included the evolutionaries and the revolutionaries.  
The evolutionaries, though not entirely satisfied with the Framework for political advancement offered 
by France were willing to work within it for the time being to claim as much privileges as may have been freely 
offered by France. This group was led then by Alexander Duala Manga Bell and later Louis Paul Aujoulat, 
Andre Marie Mbida and Amadou Ahidjo. This was the group which formed the Bloc Democratique 
Camerounais (BDC) in June 1951 2 . This contradicted sharply with revolutionary tendencies which were 
determined to alter French policy and ensure a rapid evolution towards self-government and independence. 
Alexander Duala Manga Bell represented Cameroon in the first and second constituent assemblies in France 
visibly on the evolutionary ticket. 
The constitution which was adopted following the discussions of the two constituent assemblies 
emphasized that all overseas administrations be headed by civil servants of France d’Outre Mer rather than 
Under-Secretaries answerable to the French National Assembly. The significance of these constitutional 
developments in France for Cameroon was that the French administration, in order to counteract the 
development and popularity of radical elements and entrench its power on Cameroon, used its control over the 
chiefs and the agents of local administrations to encourage the growth of pro-colonial administrative tendencies 
and in many cases ensure their election to the national and territorial assemblies3.  
Such radical tendencies were already visible in some trade unionists like Reuben Um Nyobe, Ernest 
Ouandie, Abel Kingue and Dr. Felix Roland Moumie. Using the decree of 7 August 1944 which gave 
Cameroonians the right to form trade unions, they went further to launch the first indigenous political party in 
the territory; L’Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). The UPC platform rested on three pillars: 
immediate independence, immediate reunification and non-foreign interference in the internal affairs of a unified 
Cameroon4. Such a radical departure from the common line of thinking such as the gradual approach to issues of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for ten days in every year. It increased the natives’ dislike for the French for it was strictly a tax on railway and public works. 
Such works also often grossly neglected health provisions, nutrition, housing and transport of natives since the service was 
often of short duration. However, a small number of Frenchified indigenous people were considered evolues and thus 
accorded citizen status, becoming a local elite atunned to the French presence and subservient to its interests. Such laws as 
mentioned, did not apply to citizens. 
1 For a detailed analysis of France-West African relations after WWII see J.F. A. Ajayi and  M. Crowder (eds.) History of 
West Africa, 1974, p. 622-664. 
2 Louis Paul Aujoulat who founded BDC was a French Algerian who came to Cameroun in 1938 as a physician in the service 
of the Catholic mission. He had been a member of the Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP) in France. He broke away 
from it to form the Mouvement des Independants d’outre-mer (MIO) whose local branch in Cameroon he transformed into 
BDC. He and his followers (Mbida and Ahidjo) favoured continuous ties with France and a gradual approach to issues of 
autonomy. 
3 Richard Joseph, Gaulist Africa: Cameroon Under Ahmadou Ahidjo, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978. p. 47.55 
4 For a detailed Biography of the founders of the UPC see Eugene Wonyu, Cameroon de L’UPC a L’UC: temoignage a l’aube 
de l’independence (1953-1961), 1985. and V.J. Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-1984 A Hundred Years of History, 1987. 
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political reforms as adopted by the evolutionaries was viewed as a challenge to French policies in Cameroon. 
This was because French interests in Cameroon were decisive in selecting the future leadership of the territory1 
but the UPC did not understand this. They were to test their strengths in the elections of 1951. 
In 1951, the Assemblée Representatif (ARCAM) was transformed to Assemblée Territoriale (ATCAM) 
with 50 members and limited powers. Elections were organized to select representatives to the French National 
Assembly in June. In March1952, another election was organized to elect members into ATCAM. Despite the 
elections, the French administration was ready to break the back of any political party that it considered hostile 
to its overall goals of maintaining French tutelage in Cameroon. Not surprisingly, the UPC suffered most from 
the resulting repression. Despite their tight organization and intensive campaign, they failed in their quest for the 
two second college seats reserved for African representatives in the legislative elections of June 1951. In March 
1952, none of the four UPC candidates contesting for the 24 second-college ATCAM seats in four of the 
nineteen voting districts succeeded. Even UM Nyobe lost the elections in his native district to a priest of the 
Roman Catholic Church Joseph-Antoine Melone2. The victory of Dr. Louis Paul Aujoulat’s Bloc Democratic 
Camerounaise (BDC) enabled him to become president of the Territorial assembly in Yaoundé while the UPC 
was left in the August rains to recover from the trance of the unbelievable defeats they had suffered in the two 
elections.  
While the BDC settled down to face the affairs of the territory with the minimal powers which the 
ATCAM possessed, Um Nyobe took the UPC cause to the UN. In the December 1952 and in the subsequent 
sessions the UPC leader addressed the General Assembly calling for the immediate independence and 
reunification of Cameroon. This was contradicted by Charles Okalla3 who was of the view that independence for 
French Cameroon was “premature”. Upon his return to the country, the UPC leadership experienced a smear 
campaign 4  which culminated in it adopting violent methods and consequent banning in 1955. This was 
masterminded by Roland Pré who replaced André Soucadaux as High Commissioner in 19545. 
The banning of the UPC in July 1955 and complimentary political developments in France proved that 
the year 1956 would be a year of good tidings for the political progress of the Trust Territory of French 
Cameroun. In France, the Mendes reforms6 proposed as early as 1951 saw the light of day after the 1956 
elections into the French National Assembly. These elections held on 2 January 1956 permitted one “authentic” 
Cameroonian nationalist to serve as Cameroon’s representative in the French parliament and to contribute to the 
efforts of that institution. This position was won by Andre Marie Mbida.  
In Paris, the replacement of the conservative Francois Mitterrand by forward-looking Gaston Deferre as 
Minister of France d’Outre Mer inspired the adoption of the Mendes Reforms into law No: 56-619 of 23 June 
1956. This law was generally referred to as the Outline or Framework laws (Loi Cadre). Article 9 of this law 
stipulated that concerning the government in Cameroon reforms could be carried out by decree.”7 Amongst other 
things the law provided for a Legislative assembly in Yaoundé with 70 elected deputies from a single college by 
a direct universal suffrage, a government with ministers headed by a prime minister, a Cameroonian citizenship, 
a flag, an anthem and a motto. 
Despite these initiatives the French kept a firm grip on Cameroon. The French National Assembly 
retained supreme powers over legislation and its laws continued to take precedence over decisions by the 
Cameroonian Assembly. The state public services, including the District Officers (D.Os) and traditional Rulers 
                                                          
1 W.G. Moseley, Taking Sides,2007, p.60 
2 In the legislative elections of June 1951, Um Nyobe had 3.081 votes out of total of 280.302 votes cast. In the March 1952 
elections for the Territorial Assembly the four UPC candidates had 2.732, 767, 117 and 223 votes each. V.J Ngoh (1988) 
associates BDC victory to the party’s pro-French policy and the fact that it had politicians from both the south like Andre-
Marie Mbida and the North like Amadou Ahidjo in the party 
3 Representing the socialists and the political party called Evolution Sociale Camerounaise (ESOCAM) which he had created 
in 1949 
4 Eugene, Wonyu, 1985 holds that apart from encouraging the formation of anti-UPC parties, the French rigged elections to 
disfavour the UPC,  used their influence at the UN to bloc UPC petitions, appointed hardliners like Roland Pre as High 
Commissioners, instructed chiefs not to involve people with UPC tendencies to local administrative organs, influenced 
catholic church authorities to preach against the party as violent, evil and communist, transferred UPC executives to areas 
where they could not coordinate political activities,  and were often the first to break up UPC peaceful meetings and 
demonstrations. 
5 Unlike Soucadaux, Pré was opposed to all political parties in Cameroun and restricted the powers of the ATCAM. His 
actions were especially directed to the UPC whose members were accused of spreading false rumours against Europeans. Pré 
also refused the UPC from using public facilities and transferred any suspected UPC civil servant to distant areas where it 
became difficult to coordinate party affairs. 
6 Reforms aimed at improving the political development of over-sea French territories named after the French Premier at the 
time Mendes. These reforms were passed into law as Loi Cadre in 1956. The reforms also permitted the Premier to 
implement institutional reforms by decree instead of passing through the assembly.  
7 Andre Marie Mbida, Investiture Speech May 15, 1957 
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were placed under the office of the High Commissioner, free from the control of ALCAM and the government.  
Article 7 of Decree No. 57-495 of April 1957, also gave the French government powers to annul the decisions of 
ALCAM and even dissolve it if necessary.  
However not all shades of opinion agreed that all was well with the territory. The High Commissioner 
Pierre Messmer who replaced Roland Pre in 1955 had two specific missions in Cameroun. Firstly he was to 
ensure that the 1957 statute proposed by France was adopted without modification. secondly1 he was to choose 
the right pro-French Camerounian political middleman (faithful friends’ of France) to lead the government. 
These new interlocutors were to work for French interest in the same way as the traditional and administrative 
authorities. They were to assist France to stay in Cameroun for a very long time. These were to be men who were 
either socialist or   disciples of Louis Paul Aujoulat.2 
Upon arrival, had expressed a desire to relax the repression of the UPC and contemplate a general 
amnesty. Paul Soppo Priso was secretly negotiating with government to lift the ban on the party to ensure its 
participation in the December 1956 elections into ALCAM through his newly formed Movement d’Union 
National, (MUN). Most former UPC members had joined this party en masse after the 1955 ban. Despite these 
efforts, the outlawed wing of the UPC embarked on a great terrorist campaign a few days before the elections. 
Troops were sent to all regions of unrest and a great massacre ensued with hundreds of people being shot on 
sight3.  
Despite the tense atmosphere, elections were held on 23 December 1956. The election results 
demonstrated French willingness to work with the moderates to ensure a political future for Cameroun within the 
French Union. The Union Camerounaise (UC) of Amadou Ahidjo and Arouna Njoya, with strong support from 
the northern elites and their Muslim traditional rulers, won 30 seats. The Democrats Camerounaise (DC) of 
Andre Marie Mbida, with support from the Southern forest zone won 20 seats. The Paysans Independants (PI) of 
Mathias Djoumesi from the western grassfeilds won 9 seats. The Group d’Action National Camerounaise 
(GANC) a 1956 amalgamation of  Charles Okala’s Union Sociale Camerounaise and Soppo Priso’s Movement 
d’Union National with Priso’s leadership and a strong base in the Maritime zone won 8 seats 4 . While 
Independent candidates won 3 seat. The elections created expectations in the minds of Cameroun politicians. 
They looked forward to great transformations in government and socio-economic development 
 
3. The Era of Andre Marie Mbida  
 With the passing of the Loi cadre, it was evident that French policy in Africa was gradually changing. These 
changes were motivated by British policy in Africa, internal pressures exerted by UPC terrorism, the 
dissatisfaction of the 1955 UN Visiting Mission5, the French humiliation in Indo-China, and her granting of 
independence to Morocco, Tunisia and autonomy to Togo. At this time, France still suffered from its World War 
II humiliation, and bitter internal divisions. The country was further weakened by chronic instability of the 
Fourth Republic, with one-third of its electorate aligned with antirigime Stalinist French Communist party and 
its army locked in unending and unwinnable colonial wars6. These developments were enough to whip up the 
sentiments of French Cameroonians. As the assembly opened in the New Year (1957) with Amadou Ahidjo as 
President, the major preoccupation was the development of a statute for the territory. On 16 April 1957, Decree 
No. 57-501 of 16 April 1957 made the Cameroon Statute applicable. It changed the status of the Trust Territory 
of French Cameroon to an entity known as The State of Cameroon and accorded it sovereignty. It also 
acknowledged simultaneously Cameroon’s rapid progress to political maturity. The ATCAM elected on the 23 
December 1956 became ALCAM, voted its first bureau which officially took office on the 10 May 1957. This 
day became the National day of French Cameroon and this group of people became the members of a first 
national sovereign legislative assembly in the territory.  
                                                          
1 P.M. Gaudemet, L’Autonomie Camerounaise, Review Francaise de Science Politique, 8 (1), Mars 1958, p. 62-63 
2 Ibid, p.63 
3 Eugene Wonyu, Cameroun de L’UPC a L’UC: Temoignage a l’aube de l’independence (1953-1961) p.45-55 
4 Wonyu, Cameroun de L’UPC a L’UC, pp. 45- 55 holds that the High Commissioner Pierre Messmer inspired defection 
within the ranks of the Movément d’Union Nationale (MUN) of Paul Soppo Priso and equally instigated opposition from 
Ahmadou Ahidjo and the northern deputies as well as from André Marie Mbida’s BDC. This was intended to weaken the 
movement, which Defferre considered was an instrument in the hands of UPC since most former UPC militants had become 
members of the party following the 1955 ban. Consequently, Messmer intervened directly into the politics of French 
Cameroun to select representatives and to put in place a government with which France would negotiate independence and 
transfer power to. Messmer made it a duty to avoid the members of MUN who would have been difficult to negotiate with. 
Therefore, Messmer with assistance from Guy Mollet frustrated the efforts of MUN before and during the elections 
5 V.J. Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-1985, A Hundred Years of History, 1988, p. 147. The UN Visiting Mission arrived in Cameroon 
in October 1955 to assess the political developments in the territory. The Mission was not happy with what it saw with 
regards to the demand for either independence or self-government. They concluded that if Cameroonian Unity were not 
immediately threatened, it was at least jeopardized 
6 J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order,  Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 2009. 
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On 16 May Pierre Messmer1 apparently confident of Mbida’s political stance officially appointed him 
Prime minister by Arête No: 3171 of May 16, 1957. By a separate Arête No. 3207 the High Commissioner 
named fourteen members of his government.2 Despite the fact that Mbida did not obtain the highest votes in the 
elections, he was chosen to form the first government. This could be attributed to the fact that no party had won 
absolute majority in the December 1956 elections. He was the preferred candidate because of his strong 
Christian background and his hostility to the UPC which earned him more popularity in metropolitan circles than 
Ahidjo who was suspected of having Muslim tendencies similar to those which had caused trouble for France in 
Algeria3.  
His Democrat Camerounaise merely had a below-average performance by winning 20 out of 70 seats 
coming second after the UC of Ahidjo which won 30. This modest performance notwithstanding, projected the 
DC as a major party in the south. This in turn facilitated his choice as the PM within ALCAM because his sound 
education and professional background made him more experienced than his contemporaries like Djoumessi, 
Ahidjo and Soppo Priso. He had a post-secondary education and obtained a series of diplomas from institutions 
in France. In terms of professional experience, he had held important posts of responsibility like Councillor in 
the French Union, as deputy of ARCAM and ATCAM and the French National Assembly4. This academic and 
professional background gave him an edge over his rivals for power. 
Unlike Ahidjo’s Muslim background which made him suspect to the French, Mbida’s Roman Catholic 
background favored his rise to power. Colonial authorities were confident that he would protect the Catholic 
faith and their general interest in Cameroon. Mbida had the support of important personalities in France where 
his first son, Tobi, was born and baptized by a French bishop. The French Minister of Colonies, Louis Jacquinot 
was his Godfather and this was indicative that he had good connections in France. They threw their weight 
behind him hoping that he would resolve the UPC problem since he was a politician from the south.  
On the contrary, Ahidjo was not accepted as the first PM because they knew he was from the north of 
Cameroon making it difficult for him to resolve the UPC problem.5 The failure of the UPC to participate in the 
1956 elections also favoured Mbida’s rise to power because it made it possible for his party to win almost all the 
seats in the south of Cameroon including areas that were UPC strongholds.  Had the UPC taken part in the 
election, Mbida’s party might not have won up to 20 out of the 70 seats. 
From the onset Mbida seemed to be an astute, firm and determined leader; the very type that this new 
nation needed. However, he quickly began to disappoint the people. During his investiture on May 15 1957, he 
confessed that his political program would not be phenomenal or meticulous as the rituals and teachings of the 
Bible or the Koran. He also warned that given the present conjectures and uncertainty within the economic and 
financial domain it will be imprudent and even dangerous to make a lot of promises6. 
Politically, Mbida became illusive. He considered the 1957 Statute the first of the stages of preparation 
for independence but failed to tell the people when the other stages would be achieved. He categorically refused 
to preoccupy his government with the issue of the French Union7 and embarrassingly told the people that to 
conceive ideas of independence at that moment was not only a dangerous demagogy but also an execrable crime. 
The 1957 Statute, according to him, did not require Cameroon to hurry up to independence but only permitted 
the people to research and execute henceforth, for themselves, formulas which will help them ameliorate their 
                                                          
1 D. Abwa, Commissaires et Hauts-Commissaires de la France au Cameroun (1916-1960) : Ces hommes qui ont façonné 
politiquement le Cameroun, Yaoundé, Presses Universitaires, 1998 , p. 374.Pierre Messmer, born in 1916 and at the time of 
his appointment he was the Director of Cabinet of Gaston Deffere, Minister of French Overseas (FOM). He was a trained 
colonial administrator and had the advantage to have evolved in the ranks and files of colonial administration. During the 
close to two years period he worked in Cameroun, Pierre Messmer was to accomplish three basic political missions, which 
laid the foundation of the form of independence granted to Cameroun. Firstly, he was to preserve peace and ensure that 
another embarrassing UPC uprising does not occur after the botches of Roland Pré. Secondly, he was charged with the 
responsibility of implementing the bicephalous political administrative machinery decided upon in Paris that the French 
wanted to institute in Cameroun. Lastly, he was expected to choose the major pro-French political interlocutors or middlemen 
2Vice PMI/c special affairs: Amadou Ahidjo; Minister of finance: Mathias Djoumessi; Minister of economic 
affairs: Arouna Njoya; Public works and transport mines: Kotouo Pierre; National education: Ahanda Vincent; 
Minister of public health: Haman Adama; Agriculture and animal rearing: Mandon Alfred; Minister social and 
works security: M. Marigoh; Secretary of state/information: Midouh Gaston; Secretary of state public service: 
Tsallah Germain; Secretary of state /interior: Logmo Antoine; Secretary of state/budget: Biyo Olinga Francoise; 
Secretary of state /agriculture: Omatte Talba Malla;  
3 J.F. Bayard, L’Etat du Cameroun, Paris: Press de la Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979. p46 
4 Ibid, p47 
5 Jean-Germain, G. Cameroon: Politics and Society in Critical Perspective, New York: University Press of America Inc, 2003. 
p8  
6 Andre Marie Mbida, Investiture Speech, 15 may, 1957 
7 La Presse du Cameroun, 8 Janvier 1958 
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lives and put value to the country to the benefit of all inhabitants and nothing else1.  
Mbida’s government was not only born in an atmosphere of general instability but was also plagued 
with the absence of a clear focus. Although he received popular approval in the ALCAM by forming a coalition 
government with Ahidjo’s UC, it was clear that Mbida neither pleased the French nor met the wishes of a great 
majority of Cameroonians. Consequently, soon after his investiture, evidence of dissatisfaction from the two 
sides became visible. Despite the fact that he clearly favoured close ties with France Mbida had procrastinated 
on the issue. He preferred to deal with it in future. The French viewed this as escapist.  
Mbida was preoccupied almost from the beginning with the problem of how to handle the UPC-inspired 
terrorism which necessitated on one hand strong measures to deal with it but on the other finding a peaceful 
solution. Mbida lacked both the personality and the balanced political judgment to deal with the problem. Three 
months into office Reuben Um Nyobe stated the terms on which he and his followers would lay down their arms. 
This included the dissolution of ALCAM and the calling of fresh elections, the granting of amnesty to all 
political prisoners and suspects and the granting of immediate independence.  
In September he reiterated these demands in a letter to the Prime Minister and the High Commissioner2, 
threatening violence if demands were not taken into consideration. Contrary to the wishes of the French and his 
supporters Mbida flatly rejected the proposals outright. Violence and terrorism erupted in the Sanaga-Maritime 
region. Mbida visited Boumyebel; Um Nyobe’s home town and urged all insurgents to return to normal life3. 
The UPC intensified violence on an unprecedented scale spreading to the Mungo and Bamileke regions. These 
resulted in the death of a Bamileke member of ALCAM; Samuel Wanko4 and six others around Bafoussam in 
December. From then on the UPC Nationalists instituted a state of perpetual guerrilla warfare, attacking 
government offices and destroying documents, burning church property and murdering missionaries, Europeans, 
chiefs and supporters of the administration5. 
To the disappointment of the majority of Cameroonians who preferred a peaceful solution to the UPC 
problem, Mbida requested and acquired more troops from France and proceeded with a systematic search of 
forests and villages of troubled areas for bands of the outlawed nationalists. The Prime Minister’s opponents 
made it clear that his measures were too harsh and renewed their call for a national amnesty.  
The popular opinion both at home and in the Metropole was that a peaceful solution be sought to the 
UPC problem. But Mbida considered the UPC an enemy rather than a group with which government could 
initiate dialogue. This position explains Mbida’s very strongly worded speeches and hard-line policies against 
the movement6. Mbida’s strong headedness and impatience with democratic procedure and his intransigence 
eventually antagonized his political supporters to an extent that few regretted his departure when the time came. 
In addition, Mbida adopted an authoritarian and arbitrary style of running government business and frequently 
took major decisions without consulting his cabinet. Mbida was very intolerant to criticism as was exemplified in 
his termination of the scholarship of five Cameroonian students in France for attempting to criticize him. This 
made him very unpopular because the move was seen as an attempt to frustrate young Cameroonians who ought 
to become leaders of tomorrow7. 
By the close of 1957, popular opinion was that Mbida’s replacement may bring the much needed peace 
and progress in the country. Pierre Messmer was replaced by Jean Ramadier with the belief that a new High 
commissioner would be in the best position to help the government explore the possibility of a peaceful solution 
to the countries problems8. Ramadier also arrived the territory with strict instructions to “ease the replacement of 
Mbida, if this would lead to positive developments”9.  
The year 1957 ended with Mbida being unable to fan off the heat from the fire of his miscalculations. 
Instead he was bracing for the Abong-Mbang DC congress of January 1958 without reviewing his tactics and 
without being sure that the majority of his cabinet and party accepted his program. In the congress he announced 
a ten year program which amongst other things rejected the French suggestion that Cameroon should be 
integrated in the French Union. Instead, he suggested that it should remain a trust territory. This antagonized the 
French authorities especially at a time when French desire to consolidate the French Union was at its peak. 
Mbida opted for a Territorial Ministerial Council for French Cameroon which would be allowed to deliberate 
                                                          
1 Andre Marie Mbida, Investiture Speech, May 15, 1957. 
2 La Presse Camerounaise, September 21, 1957 (NAY) 
3 Andre Marie Mbida, Discours Prononce le 9 Novembre 1957 a Boumyebel. (NAY).  Some historians write that Mbida 
threatened the people by giving them 10 days to leave the forests or face the consequences but his is not visible in the speech 
he made there on that day. 
4 La Presse Camerounaise, 15 Novembre, 1957. 
5 E. Wonyu, Cameroun de L’UPC a L’UC: temoignaage a l’aube de l’independence 1953-1961, 1985. p.48-55 
6 Edith Mireille Tegna, Parlementarisme et Pouvoir Parlementaire au Cameroun Entre 1942 et 1972, 2008, p.99 
7 Ibid.  p.98 
8 D. Abwa,  p. 374. it was noted that Mbida often quarreled with Messmer. 
9 Ibid, p. 99. 
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and legislate on all matters not related to the metropole. He wanted to prevent France from imposing her 
personnel on French Cameroon. He called for the creation of several regional states and proposed that southern 
Christian civil servants be transferred to the Muslim North of Cameroon. These were Mbida’s finishing strokes. 
These proposals induced the Muslim ministers in his government to resign thereby precipitating his fall from 
power1.  
Generally, northern Muslims tended to identify the southerners with the UPC. Thus they viewed the 
demand for independence as a danger to the privileges they enjoyed under French colonial rule. Also they feared 
that Mdida’s policy would spread UPC tendencies to the  north and break up their traditionalist feudal societies. 
The lamidos preferred to be annexed to their eastern neighbours (Chad and Ubangi-Shari) so that they would 
continue under French administration and enjoy its privileges if Mbida had to continue with this policy of 
transferring southerners to the north2. Finally, Mbida embarrassed everybody when he failed to mention his 
views on Cameroon’s independence and claiming that reunification was still far fetched.  
In the context of the decolonization in French Africa, Mbida was not the only French African leader 
who failed to take seriously the issue of independence. Houphouet Boigny, Leopold Sedar Senghor and (later) 
Amadou Ahidjo in various instances used the following words to indicate their desire to remain under French 
tutelage 
In Africa, when children grow up, they leave their parents’ hut and build a hut of their own by 
its side. We don’t want to leave the French compound. We have grown up in it and it is good 
to be alive in it. We want simply to build our own huts3. 
In Cameroon a major reason was that France continued to dominate the economic, political and 
administrative structures of the territory. French public investments in Cameroun were very high and primary 
exports were supported by subsidies from France. The territory’s dependence on France through membership of 
the Franc zone, bilateral agreements and lack of direct trading partners outside the franc zone made it difficult 
for the territory to diversify trade for a foreseeable future. 
Besides, the French subsidized the administrative budget which consumed up to 60% of the recurrent 
budget of the territory4. The economy was not only dependent on France but it was run by Frenchmen at both 
managerial and subaltern levels. More than 20% of the top administrators in the territory were French5. For 
instance Decisions No. 188, 184, 183, 187, 198 and 169 of 10 February 1958 installed French senior 
administrators into the Over-sea service, general administration, military cabinet, justice, financial and health 
services in Cameroon respectively. As late as January 1959 the French were still transferring and appointing 
Frenchmen into such services. By Decision No. 55 of 21 January 1959 the high commissioner introduced 105 
new French senior executives into the Ahidjo government6.  
Also there had been no policy to Africanize the civil service as had been introduced in British 
Cameroons. Therefore any talk of breakaway from France implied a potential dislocation of the services. 
Furthermore the French authorities were the ones who managed the electoral machinery and any attempt to 
achieve a breakaway from France using this machine required an organization that could effectively combat the 
stranglehold of France over it. Um Nyobe experienced this in the 1951 and 1952 elections.  
Another reason why most people never talked of outright independence was that apart from the 
outlawed UPC, the Cameroun political class was itself committed to France. They had been educated at 
assimilationist schools and era, employed by and large in the French administration; they participated in the 
French National Assembly and were devotee of French culture. This created an emotional bond between them 
and their French masters. The chiefs were the agents of French administration and could be relied upon to ensure 
the preservation of French interests. These chiefs and D.Os were under the direct jurisdiction of the High 
Commissioner 7  and their tributes and allowances were assured so long as they showed consciousness in 
maintaining the statusquo. 
Within such limits, there is no doubt that Andre-Marie Mbida wanted as much autonomy for Cameroon 
as possible but could not realistically demand independence. From this perspective independence without 
France’s goodwill seemed a remote prospect. Mbida never understood this. Back from Abong-Mbang Mbida 
came face to face with the effects that his Ten Year Programme for a political future without independence and 
reunification had brought to his door steps. The UC rejected the program, Ahidjo his closest collaborator and his 
                                                          
1 Richard Joseph,  1978, p. 51 
2 Richard Joseph,  1978, p. 51 
3 Quoted in J.F.A Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds) History of Africa, Vol.2, 1974. p.693. In 1957 Senghor was quoted to 
have said this in the National Assembly. Ahidjo used it in the celebration of the 1st anniversary of the national Day in 1958. 
this indicated their stance with regards to  membership of the French Union. 
4 J.F.A. Ajayi and Micheal Crowder, History of West Africa, Vol.2, 1974, p.693. 
5 Journal official de l’Etat du Cameroon 11, 26  February 1959. p159, p.160. 
6 Ibid, p.159-160 
7 J.F.A. Ajayi and Micheal Crowder, History of West Africa, Vol.2, 1974, p.693.  
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followers in the cabinet deserted him. Mbida replaced them with members of his own DC. But the High 
Commissioner Jean Ramadier refused to endorse his new government. Mbida quickly petitioned the French 
authorities and Ramadier was recalled on 18 February (barely 3 weeks of his taking office) and replaced by 
Xavier Torre1.  
The coming of Torre to Cameroon was at a time when there were visible changes in French colonial 
policies which were in Favour of granting independence to the colonies within the French Community. Torre 
was therefore required to bring Cameroun to independence without loosing the prerogatives of French interest.2 
 In the exercise of this assignment Torre received instructions from the team put in place in France that 
was made up of the Minister of FOM (Gérard Jacquet) and the permanent representative of France to the UN 
Trusteeship Council (Kosczuisko-Morizet). Kosczuisko was to help Torre defend Cameroun position in the UN 
against all efforts of destabilization by UPC. Ahidjo was part of the team with whom he had to prepare the stage 
for a negotiated independence for Cameroun.3 Xavier Torre oriented his actions toward the independence of 
Cameroun in two directions: internally; the eradication of nationalist resistance to French policies within the 
territory and externally, the convincing of international opinion that independence of Cameroun was favoured by 
France. 
Despite Ramadier’s replacement it was clear that Mbida’s government would not have the endorsement 
of ALCAM considering that he did not have a majority. Besides nobody was happy with the fact that since 
Mbida became PM, UPC violence had intensified greatly4. With all other things weighing on his shoulders 
Mbida threw in the towel and resigned on 17 February 1958. That same day the amnesty legislation that had 
been passed by the French Parliament on 7 February was promulgated into law in Cameroon. 
 
4. Amadou Ahidjo: 1958-1960 
The adverse effects of Mbida’s policies, the hard-line he adopted towards UPC and the unpopular reform 
proposals coupled with developments in France; the reactions of other French territories towards French colonial 
rule and the changes taking place in British colonies convinced the French that they could not cling anymore to 
the initial dreams of an everlasting French empire. The coming to power of De Gaulle in 1958 and his tour of 
certain African territories confirmed this fact and made him begin to realize how rapidly the demand for full 
independence was gaining ground in the influential urban areas of colonial France. In Brazzaville for instance he 
was confronted by banners demanding immediate independence. These realities convinced De Gaulle that the 
wind of change was also blowing over French territories.  
By Arrete No. 207 of 19 February 1958, Jean Ramadier before leaving Cameroon appointed Amadou 
Ahidjo Prime Minister and head of Government. This was in the wake of Mbida’s letter of resignation No. 
733/CAB/PM of 16 February. In a separate Arête No. 208 of 20 February the High Commissioner confirmed the 
Members of Ahidjo’s first government5. 
Some names from the Mbida administration were still visible in Ahidjo’s first government. Arouna 
Njoya who was Mbida’s Minister of Finance became Public Health Minister. Haman Adama Public Health 
Minister under Mbida became Public Services Minister although he died shortly afterwards. Mandon Alfred and 
Talba Malla maintained the duties of Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State respectively although the 
appellation changed from Agriculture to Production. Michel Njine seemed to have benefited the most, moving 
from Minister of Public Works to Vice Prime Minister in-charge of National Education.  
In his investiture speech, Ahidjo rested his policy on three basic principles: The Cameroon Ideal, 
Institutional Reforms adapted to the changing times and a government; a team of men capable of initiating and 
following up a program consistent with the Reforms. Within the Cameroon ideal, he further emphasized unity, 
nation building and Franco-Cameroon cooperation. As far as Cameroonian Unity was concerned, Ahidjo dreamt 
of a nation free from tribal and regional loyalties, an effective Cameroonian community in which no one would 
see himself as pro or anti-government; in which there would be a strong commitment to the national flag and the 
                                                          
1 Like his Predecessors Torre was trained in the colonial school but unlike them he had never exercised any function in the 
colonies. He had been used to executing instructions received from his superior rather than taking initiatives of his own. Thus, 
he possessed the qualities required by France to resolve the problem in Cameroun that was initiated by Messmer and had 
taken a decisive turn under Ramadier. The coming of Torre to Cameroon was at a time when there were visible changes in 
French colonial policies which were in Favour of granting independence to the colonies within the French Community. Torre 
was therefore required to bring Cameroun to independence without loosing the prerogatives of French interest 
2Ph. Gaillard, Ahmadou Ahidjo, Patriote et Despote, Ba^tisseur de l’Etat Camerounais, Paris, JA Livres, 1994, pp. 35-36; 
Eyinga, L’UPC Une Revolution, p.96.  
3 Abwa,  1998 p. 409. 
4 Abwa, 1998, p. 403 indicates that the High Commissioner Pierre Messmer had testified this in Paris in Novemeber 1957, 
and that Mbida’s haughtiness did not match  the coolness with which he would have loved matters like the UPC to be 
approached. He was therefore opting for his removal. 
5 Journal official de l’Etat Sous Tutelle du Cameroun, p.250.  
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principle of reunification of the two Cameroons. With the Cameroonian Nation he foresaw a greater autonomy 
by expanding the 1957 statute in order to meet the aspirations of effective independence within a reasonable time 
frame.  Within the domain of Franco-Cameroon cooperation, the PM emphasized that association with France 
was necessary and even indispensable for Cameroonians 1  since the territory did not yet possess necessary 
material, financial, structural and man-power requirements the territory would need at the dawn of independence.  
He adopted some of these ideas as the official platform of le Movement d’Union Camerounaise 
congress in Garoua on 6 January2. In his investiture speech Ahidjo told ALCAM that there was need for the 
body to ask France to expand the 1957 Statute. ALCAM was also expected to ask France to acknowledge the 
wish for the state of Cameroon to attain independence, transfer to the state of Cameroon all competences relating 
to internal matters and to continue with the trusteeship until the proclamation of independence. 
Hence forth events took a revolutionary turn. On Thursday 12 June Ahidjo put before ALCAM a 
resolution which among other things would approve the revision and enlargement of the 1957 statute, grant his 
government authority to enter into negotiations with the French government and request the accession of 
Cameroon to sovereign statehood within the shortest possible time.  
ALCAM met to discuss this project which was in essence a modification of Decree No. 57-501 of 16 
April 1957. During the discussions on this resolution deputies of Mbida’s  Groupe des Democrate Camerounaise 
declared that they would not take part. Their leader Mbida and Akono, Biyo’o, Ahanda, Ngaba, Ndzana, Yakana, 
Amougou and Djoumesi walked out. Marigoh,  Ndobo and Mabaya of the same group remained.  After heated 
debates lasting many hours ALCAM adopted the proposal by 30 votes for, 2 against and 1 abstention. The two 
‘No’ votes were cast by Mabaya and Ndibo deputies from the east and Medou was the abstention. Those who 
cast the negative votes did so on the grounds that decisions on independence and reunification should have been 
made in a referendum3. 
The law was adopted by the Assembly in conformity with article 59 of Decree No. 57/501 on the 
Statute of Cameroon and it asked the government of France to modify the statute of Cameroon in a way as to 
recognize the state of Cameroon and their desire to gain independence at the end of the trusteeship, transfer to 
the state all the competences relative to the management of internal affairs and maintain the UN Trusteeship. 
After the ALCAM revision of the Statute the Prime Minister left Cameroon on 21 June 1958 to begin 
negotiations with France. The record of these negotiations reflects the program which the outlawed UPC had for 
Cameroon. The only difference being that Ahidjo and his team had understood that a radical approach to win 
such concessions would not have achieved positive results considering the fact that President Charles de Gaulle 
had warned leaders at the time that “France would intervene if it considered its interests at jeopardy4.” Such 
interests had been the basis for the selection of future leadership in French territories in Africa. What mattered, 
therefore, for Ahidjo was a gradual cajoling “stage by stage” approach. While Ahidjo was acknowledging that 
UPC terrorist activities had considerably subsided, reports of their intensification in the Sanaga-Maritime were 
reaching him in Paris. This caused him to respond with relative harshness. He instructed that patrol teams be 
stepped up and curfews be intensified5. These measures saw the killing of the UPC founder and leader Reuben 
Um Nyobe in his native Boumyebel on 13 September 1958.  
The death of Um Nyobe dealt a severe blow on the movement. The second in command in this region 
and Nyobe’s secretary Mayi Matip rebels to abandon the Maquis and declare their readiness to return to legal 
opposition. This coincided with the visit of the Prime Minister to the Mbam area. Ahidjo proposed a program for 
partial amnesty which Matip accepted on 22 September6. He urged his fellow rebels to do same. In doing so, 
Matip and his companions concealed neither their membership of the UPC nor the part they had played in the 
terrorist campaigns under Um Nyobe. In less than a month more than 3000 UPC guerrillas laid down their arms 
in the Sanaga-Maritime region7, thereby bringing the rebellion in that area to a virtual end. Ahidjo reacted by 
announcing that government has made available to the people of the Sanaga-maritime the sum of 264 Million 
francs for infrastructural development; railway, communication and farm to market roads, 74 million francs for 
agricultural development and 22 million francs for social equipments, schools and hospitals8 
With the assassination of Um Nyobe and the positive developments evidenced by the disavowal of 
                                                          
1 For a detailed outline of his plan for Cameroon, see Ahidjo’s Discoure d’ Investiture a l’ ALCAM, 19 February 1958 
2 La Presse Camerounaise of Friday 9 January, 1958. 
3 La Presse Camerounaise, Friday, of 13 June 1958, and of Monday, 16 June 1958. 
4 Moseley, W.G.,2007. p.60. 
5 La Presse du Cameroun of 12, 13 and 14 Juliet 1958 
6 La Presse du Cameroun of Wednesday, 1 October 1958 
7 Dix Ans d’Action Gouvernmental, published on the 10th Anniversary of Ahidjo’s coming to Power. 
8 These developments and many more promises were made as early as June 26 1958 during a radio address to the nation 
before he left for France the following day. Details are available in La Presse du Cameroun of Saturday 27 June 1958. La 
Presse Camerounaise of June 16 even quotes Ahidjo to have promised to receive the UPC with open hands should they 
decide to abandon terrorism. This indicates the constant threat that the UPC posed to the Ahidjo regime. 
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terrorism by Matip and his men as well as the return of people to normal life in the Sanaga-Maritime, the 
committee for Amnesty and National Reconciliation came up with the following recommendations: to abolish 
the enclosures1 which the government had created to contain the UPC and ensure the effective return of people 
to their original villages, to envisage an immediate withdrawal of troops so that peace and stability will return to 
those villages where they existed and to ensure a vote for a law on complete and unconditional amnesty for all 
political criminals since May 1955 
Contrary to the call by the Committee for Amnesty and National Reconciliation, the surrender of Mayi 
Matip was vehemently condemned by Felix Roland Moumie, the UPC leader in the Bamileke area, who 
continued the rebellion in the Bamileke and Mungo regions. In the night of September 28 1958 in the locality of 
Nantem in the Mungo region the official Cameroon press reported that a gang of about 30 individuals coming 
from English Cameroons used matchets to cause havoc in the Mungo area. Life around the border towns and 
villages between British and French Cameroons became very insecure and uncertain2.  
Meanwhile as the month of October rolled on all focus was on Yaoundé as the ALCAM resumed on 18 
October 1958 for another important session. The statute for which purpose Ahidjo had spent the later part of the 
month of June and early July in Paris and for which he had held frank talks with the Overseas Ministry personnel 
and ending with De Gaulle on the 12 July, had been approved. It envisaged the transfer of the baton of control of 
all services under the High Commissioner to the Cameroon government as from 1 January 1959. These included 
the administration and Personnel of The High Commissioner’s Delegations of Douala and Garoua, chiefs, 
administrative heads and their assistants; judicial services, administrative tribunals, public security, the 
Cameroon Guard, Ports Control, meteorological services, local flights and airports3.  
This statute was not necessarily achieved by Ahidjo’s wit or by French largesse and good will. It was 
clear to the PM that while he was lobbying, France’s acceptance of Cameroon’s steady progress towards 
statehood would not be achieved without strings attached. These strings were the conventions signed between 
Ahidjo and The French. First, there was a monetary convention which implied that Cameroon would remain in 
the Franc zone. Second, there was a defence convention which required Cameroon not to establish an army yet 
and French control of it when created. Third, a  convention relating to external trade requiring Cameroon to 
channel exports to France and to consume French goods, fourth, a convention specifying conditions for the 
transfer of Judicial Powers and finally, a convention relating to the terms of “cultural exchange” from which the 
establishment of French Cultural centres took origin4. 
Ahidjo pointed out that the duration of this statute would not exceed one year. Consequently, 
Cameroonians could demand independence at the end of that period. It should be emphasized that the steps 
leading to the adoption of the 1958 statute for the Cameroons under French Trusteeship were consistent with De 
Gaulle’s strategy for Overseas France. This strategy had just then led to the referendum in French colonies, the 
independence of Guinea of Sekou Toure and the creation of the Republic of Madagascar. It was made clear by 
Ahidjo that Cameroun would have demanded independence within the framework of the 28 September 
referendum in French colonies but for its trusteeship status. To this effect the Cameroon government asked the 
French government to obtain an accord which will permit the territory to petition the UNO on the issue. Positive 
notes relating to this were indicated in a letter addressed to Ahidjo by the Minister of France d’Outre Mer. The 
minister explained that “France was disposed to immediately request the UN General Assembly the end of the 
trusteeship if (Cameroon) can write such a request5”. This of course demonstrated that the end of the trusteeship 
and independence depended not more on France but on Cameroonians themselves so long as the people knew 
what they wanted and the procedures to follow.  
To follow up the PM’s 18 October ALCAM deliberations, the government prepared a draft resolution to 
ask the UN to end the trusteeship in French Cameroon. Among other things the draft resolution expressed the 
desire of Cameroun to move towards national independence on January 1 1960 and also affirmed her 
commitment to the principles of Reunification of the two Cameroons. It also provided that all dispositions and 
measures be taken for the people concerned to freely decide on the issue before 1 January 19606. It also 
condemned any effort to delay the accession to total sovereignty of the people of Cameroon and paid homage to 
France for her efforts in developing and leading Cameroon to this end and for renewing her wish of 12 June 
                                                          
1 Apart from solving the UPC terrorist activities, the policy of Regroupement des Villages was a regular feature of French 
colonial policy in Africa. It aimed at resettling dispersed and shifting Cameroonian communities into larger permanent 
villages on main roads. Moseley (2007) holds that one of the main aims of these enclosures and regroupments was to control 
the local people-to oblige them to render tax and labour and to prevent further rebellions. 
2 La Presse du Cameroun of 1 October, 1958. V.G. Fanso, in Cameroun History for Schools and Colleges reports a series of 
troubles caused in the other UPC strongholds as a result of Matip’s denouncement of the terrorist movement. 
3 Amadou Ahidjo, Communication du Premier Ministre le 18 Octobre 1958 a L’Assemblee legislative du Cameroun. P.7. 
4 Ibid. p.10 
5 La Presse Camerounaise of 20 October 1958 
6 This is the amended version of the text. The initial text submitted to ALCAM didn’t read the same. 
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1958 to see Cameroon independent and sovereign. This text was presented to ALCAM and adopted by 46 votes 
for and seven against. It should be noted that many of the deputies who did not support the 12 June statute: 
Mabaya, Ndibo, Medou who abstained, and Soppo Priso who joined DC deputies in their walk out, explained 
their action by the fact that they felt that such decisions weighing on the overall destiny of the nation would have 
been made by referendum.  But by October their views had considerably changed1.  
The policy of the Ahidjo regime was for a gradual step by step accession to independence and from all 
indications this was yielding fruits. But many political initiates kept wondering why the Cameroon government 
had to wait for another year to achieve it. The present statute was the last stage in this gradual step by step 
process and required the establishment of a fixed calendar with definite dates to ensure effective preparation. 
Also the unique international status of Cameroon required that the territory submit a resolution to the UN to let it 
know their decisions to attain independence. Such decisions could not expect immediate answers and for a 
people committed to the principles of international body, Cameroon could not declare independence unilaterally. 
Independence could only be obtained if the UN ended the trusteeship and France as administering authority 
consented. 
However, in order not to waste time, the Prime Minister was empowered to press on France to ensure 
the passing of the resolution especially as the UN was in session. This would have avoided the Togoland 
experience in which they spent two years waiting for a resolution to be passed. It was also expected that before 
the resolution is passed lifting the trusteeship all measures would have been taken at all levels and it was to show 
such an attachment that ALCAM was taking such a gradual option. 
As the year drew to a gradual close, a few other major events are worth mentioning. First the dates of 
the 4th UN Visiting Mission to Cameroon were announced as 14 November to 9 December2.  The impressions 
gathered from the nation-wide tour and discussions with the various stakeholders were positive. The mission 
among other things declared that the desire for the territory to gain independence on I January 1960 was in 
conformity with the wishes of the people. They also indicated that the wishes were justified because of the way 
ALCAM and government handled government business. Again, they added that the establishment of a 
constitution should be a purely internal affair, that holding an election before independence was not necessary 
and that a general amnesty was worthwhile if not imperative .Their positive findings contributed to the 
favourable response of the UN to the French request for the abrogation of the trusteeship agreement and the 
setting of the date for Cameroon independence on 1 January 1960. This was done on 28 October 1958 with the 
assistance of the French Permanent Representative to the Trusteeship Council Mr. Jacque Kosciusko-Morizet3. 
The new statute came into force on 1 January 1959. Cameroon achieved complete domestic autonomy 
and its elected authorities took over all powers of legislation, administration and justice. The Cameroon identity 
was recognized internationally. The year proved to be packed full of activities in preparation for independence. 
As early as 8 January a conference of regional chiefs opened in Yaoundé on the theme “application of the statute 
of complete internal autonomy” in which the chiefs were schooled on the development trends and their role in 
this process. In the same vein at the court of appeal in Yaoundé a ceremony was held on 13 January marking the 
transfer of judicial powers to the Cameroon government.  
Another UN mission to Cameroun was affected by M. D. Protitch, Deputy Secretary on the question of 
Trusteeship from 22 to 25 January 1959. This was because the Trusteeship council of the UN was to examine the 
situation in some African countries under trusteeship as from 30 January and the General Assembly was to hold 
a special session, which was to start on 20 February 1959 on the question of the future of the territories of  
Cameroon under French and British Trusteeship. He met with Ahidjo on 24 January 1959 at Foumban. In the 
morning of 25 January, he met with chef supérieur Martin Abega Atangana and two other delegations in 
                                                          
1 In the October votes Priso declared that he is satisfied with the steps that the government had made so far on the issue. This 
state of progress makes a referendum irrelevant and uncalled for. This change of view could also have been seen from the 
fact that ALCAM recognized as the representative of the wishes of the Cameroonians had already clearly expressed their 
wish to be independent.  Secondly the trusteeship agreement had prescribed that the people should be consulted on the choice 
of government, in order for the UN to be assured that the country does not obtain independence with a political regime 
contrary to the principles of the UN charter. This had been satisfactorily done in view of the Cameroon constitution. Thirdly 
other trust territories, it was clear, were moving towards attaining independence without a referendum. Consequently there 
would be no problem if the present track taken by the government towards independence excludes the holding of a 
referendum. 
2 La Presse Camerounaise, Saturday 31 January and Sunday 1 February 1959. The mission was composed of Benjamin Geric 
(USA) was President, George Salomon (Haiti), Rikhi (India) and MG Throp (New Zealand). This mission had as special 
mandate to examine and determine whether the measures put in place by France conforms to the objectives of the UN Charter 
as article 76 stipulated. The mission made a nation wide tour, contacted government officials and members of parliament 
inorder to gather information on the state of political, social and economic life of Cameroun. 
3 Daniel Abwa and Abel Eyinga explain that the role of this personality was to ensure that Cameroun obtains independence 
on French terms and to ensure that no reports get to the UN which will tarnish French image in the organization.  
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Yaounde 1 . These were the Union Nationale des Mère Camerounaise (UNAMEC) and Bureau Nationale 
Kamerounais des Peuples Africains (BNKCPA). He had an intimate launch with them at Ralais Aériens in 
Yaounde before taking his flight to Douala during which he had the opportunity to discuss with Xavier Torre. 
On the 12 and 14 March The Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly of the UN respectively 
responded positively to the October 1958 request that the French government had placed before them to end the 
trusteeship in Cameroon by 1 January 1960. By a majority vote of 56 and 23 abstentions they supported Ahidjo’s 
programme and voted to terminate the trusteeship on January 1 1960. This was done without fresh elections as 
Felix Moumie the exiled UPC leader, had demanded. Although there was no negative vote, success was not 
achieved without heated debates. Although there was no negative vote, success was not achieved without heated 
debates. Thirty petitions in all were heard by the Trusteeship Council.2  
Felix Moumie apart from calling for the dissolution of ALCAM and the holding of new elections also 
insisted that independence must be granted to both British and French Cameroons at the same time. Jacques 
Ngom, president of the trade union called Union Generale des Travailleurs du Cameroun, shared Moumie’s 
view. Meanwhile, Mayi Matip who represented des Anciens Detenus Politiques et Refugiers called for a general 
amnesty, which would ensure national reconciliation. Another petitioner, Tchoumba argued that independence 
could not be granted to French Cameroun because the territory was under military occupation. This intervention 
greatly worried Kosciusko who claimed that the French had less than 200 troops in Cameroun to guard about 
600km of national frontier. Henry Cabot Lodge, the USA representatives spoke seriously in support of the 
Government and the Assembly of Cameroun.  
On the 12 April 1959 by-elections took place in the Sanaga-Maritime, Nyong et Kelle. Mayi Matip the 
UPC leader who had accepted the partial amnesty offered by Ahidjo scored 35.020, Antoine Logmo 6.191, and 
Prince Alexander Bell 2.901 votes. These elections were held to fill up the empty ALCAM seats left by the 
assassination of candidates from the area who had won the December 1956 elections. The administration in order 
to prove that it was fair for UPC terrorists to abandon marquis activities and join active politics made it possible 
for Mayi Matip and his associated to win the elections. Once in parliament they carried out vociferous opposition 
both inside ALCAM and out but condemned those of their members who had refused to lay down their arms and 
accept the government’s amnesty.  
To consolidate his grip on the territory, Ahidjo acquired special powers from ALCAM which enabled 
him to impose a curfew, an internal pass system, the censorship of private mails and the arrest of any suspected 
individual. Although these and other repressive measures were meant to limit UPC activities, they did not deter 
the terrorists from carrying activities in Douala, Mbalmayo, Mbanga, Yaounde and the Bassa and Bamileke 
territories in the nights of 27 and 28 June 19593. This out all offensive which the UPC started was motivated by 
the approaching 1 January 1960 which it viewed would be fatal to its hopes of ever gaining power. With these 
new threats of the UPC, Ahidjo knew that his position was still fragile but was not ready to let any of such 
hurdles deter him. To consolidate his position, he decided to bloc the re-election of Daniel Kamejou to the 
presidency of ALCAM and stripped Michel Njine of the Vice Premiership4. These were leaders in the UC from 
the Bamileke region where UPC terrorist activities had intensified. Ahidjo was gradually developing distrust for 
the Bamileke partly because of the support that the people in this area gave the nationalists5. Ahidjo also opted 
for an-all-out-attack on all suspected areas and also created self-defence militia units. A series of state of alerts 
which usually lasted for three months and were renewable were passed6. Other powers which the PM acquired 
from the assembly included the Plein pouvior and the project de loi. The plein pouvoir enabled the government 
to rule by decree for a maximum period of six months and empower a commission to draft a constitution with 
the assistance of a consultative committee. The Project de loi was to grant full and unconditional amnesty to all 
people living in the Sanaga Maritime and Nyong et Sanaga regions who had committed political crimes. These 
bills when presented to the assembly provoked heated debates but were passed by a vote of 50 to 12 with one 
abstention. However instead of a full amnesty what the political criminals received was a partial amnesty7.  
On the 30 October ALCAM elected a Consultative Commission to help the government to prepare for 
independence. On 1 January 1960, the independence of Cameroon was proclaimed by the UN Secretary General 
                                                          
1 La Presse du Cameroun, Samedi 24 et Dimanche 25 Janvier 1959 
2 ibid., Samedi 14 et Dimanche 15 ; Mecredi 18 ; Lundi 23 ; Jeudi 26, n° 2652 ; Vendredi 27 n° 2653, Fevrier et Lundi 2 ; 
Mecredi 4 ; Jeudi 5 ; Vendredi 6 ; Lundi 9 n° 2661 ; Mecredi 11 n° 2663 ; Jeudi 12 n° 2664 ; Vendredi 13 n°  2665 ; Lundi 16 
n° 2667 ;Samedi 21et Dimanch 22 Mars, 1959. 
3 V.J. Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-1985: A Hundred years of History, 1987, p158-159. 
4 Richard Joseph, 1978, p.57 
5 V.J. Ngoh, 1987, p.159 
6 For instance Arrete No. 3270 of 29 September 1959 instituted a state of alert in the Wouri Division and Odornance No. 02 
of 12 January 1960 instituted a state of alert in the Wouri,Bamileke, Nyong et Kelle, Ntem, Dja et Lobo, Kribi and Mungo till 
further notice. Cited in Ngoh 1987, p159. 
7 VJ Ngoh, 1987, p160 
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Dag Hammarskjold under the name of Republic of Cameroon with a green, red, yellow flag. The outlawed UPC 
violently clashed with government forces in Yaoundé and Douala. The clashes led left 40 natives and three 
Europeans dead. They were reacting to the fact that they had been cheated by history. Being the architect of 
Cameroons independence and reunification against all odds and seeing these dreams realized by those who had 
struggled to stifle these demands was indeed frustrating. Work on the constitution was finalized and on the 21 
February 1960, it was adopted by a referendum whose results Ahidjo still found necessary to manipulate 
(especially in the north)1 and was elected President of the Republic on 5 May2. From the 15 to 17 July 1960 
Ahidjo paid an official visit to British Cameroons in which broad outlines of reunification were discussed.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of the chapter was to trace the series of events that led to independence. Looking at these 
milestones, one would readily identify four stakeholders. These are the UN, the French as administering 
authority, the UPC and the Radical Tendencies and the Moderate (Pro-French) Cameroon Politicians. As to 
which group credit for the attainment of independence would be ascribed, this remains a matter of personal 
judgment. Questions as to whether independence was given to Cameroun or taken by Cameroon are subjective 
and only require a reading of the trends and arriving at independent conclusions.  
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